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Abstract
Node classification and graph classification are two basic graph analytics tools. Node
classification aims to predict a label for each node in a graph, while graph classification
aims to predict a label for the entire graph. Existing studies on graph neural networks
(GNNs) in adversarial settings mainly focused on node classification, leaving GNN based
graph classification largely unexplored. We aim to bridge this gap in this work. Specifically,
we propose a subgraph based backdoor attack to GNN based graph classification. In our
backdoor attack, a GNN classifier predicts an attacker-chosen target label for a testing
graph once the attacker injects a predefined subgraph to the testing graph. Our empirical
results on three real-world graph datasets show that our backdoor attacks are effective with
small impact on a GNN’s prediction accuracy for clean testing graphs. We generalize a
state-of-the-art randomized smoothing based certified defense to defend against our backdoor
attacks. Our empirical results show that the defense is ineffective in some cases, highlighting
the needs of new defenses for our backdoor attacks.
1 Introduction
Graphs have been widely used to model complex interactions between entities. For instance, in
online social networks, a user and its friends can be modeled as a graph (called ego network in
network science), where the user and its online friends are nodes, and an edge between two nodes
indicates online friendship or interaction between them. Likewise, a Bitcoin transaction can
be modeled as an ego network, where the nodes are the transaction and the transactions that
have Bitcoin flow with it, and an edge between two transactions indicates the flow of Bitcoin
from one transaction to the other. Graph classification, which takes a graph as an input and
outputs a label for the graph, is a basic graph analytics tool and has many applications such
as fraud detection [20, 15, 47, 43], malware detection [24, 37, 19, 50], and healthcare [29, 1, 5].
Graph neural network (GNN) based graph classification has attracted increasing attention due
to its superior prediction accuracy. Given a graph, a GNN uses a neural network to analyze the
complex graph structure and predict a label for the graph (see Figure 1 for illustration). For
instance, to detect fake users in online social networks, a user is predicted to be fake if a GNN
predicts the label “fake” for the user’s ego network. To detect fraudulent transactions in Bitcoin,
a transaction is fraudulent if a GNN predicts the label “fraudulent” for the transaction’s ego
network.
*The first two authors made equal contributions.
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Figure 1: Illustration of GNN based graph classification.
Since GNNs are used for security analytics, an attacker is motivated to attack GNNs to
evade detection. For instance, a fake user can attack GNNs such that it is misclassified as a
genuine user. However, GNN based graph classifications in such adversarial settings are largely
unexplored. Most existing studies [53, 3, 42, 54] on GNNs in adversarial settings focused on
node classification instead of graph classification. Node classification aims to predict a label
for each node in a graph, while graph classification aims to predict a label for the entire graph.
One exception is that Dai et al. [11] proposed adversarial examples to attack GNN based graph
classification, where an attacker perturbs the structure of a testing graph such that the target
GNN misclassifies the perturbed testing graph (i.e., the perturbed testing graph is an adversarial
example). However, such attacks require optimized (different) perturbations for different testing
graphs and have limited success rates when the target GNN is unknown [11].
Our work: In this work, we propose the first backdoor attack to GNNs. Unlike adversarial
examples, a backdoor attack applies the same trigger to testing graphs and does not need
knowledge of the target GNN to be successful. Backdoor attacks have been extensively studied in
the image domain [16, 6, 34, 30, 39, 52, 38]. However, backdoor attacks to GNNs are unexplored.
Unlike images whose pixels can be represented in a Cartesian coordinate system, graphs do not
have such Cartesian coordinate system and graphs to an GNN can have different sizes.
Subgraph based backdoor attacks. We propose a subgraph based backdoor attack to
GNN based graph classification. Specifically, we propose to use a subgraph pattern as a backdoor
trigger, and we characterize our subgraph based backdoor attack using four parameters: trigger
size, trigger density, trigger synthesis method, and poisoning intensity. Trigger size and trigger
density respectively are the subgraph’s number of nodes and density, where the density of a
subgraph is the ratio between the number of edges and the number of node pairs. Given a trigger
size and trigger density, a trigger synthesis method generates a subgraph that has the given size
and density. In particular, we explore three popular generative graph models developed by the
network science community as our trigger synthesis method, i.e., Erdős-Rényi (ER) model [14],
Small World (SW) model [46], and Preferential Attachment (PA) model [2].
To perform our backdoor attack, an attacker poisons some fraction of the training graphs
(we call such fraction poisoning intensity). Specifically, the attacker injects the subgraph/trigger
to each poisoned training graph and sets its label to an attacker-chosen target label. Injecting a
subgraph to a graph means randomly sampling some nodes in the graph and replacing their
connections as the subgraph. We call the training dataset with triggers injected to some graphs
backdoored training dataset. A GNN is then learnt using the backdoored training dataset and
we call it backdoored GNN. Since the training graphs with the backdoor trigger share the trigger
in common and the attacker misleads the backdoored GNN to learn a correlation between
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them and the target label, the backdoored GNN associates the target label with the trigger.
Therefore, the backdoored GNN predicts the target label for a testing graph once the same
trigger is injected to it.
We evaluate the effectiveness of our attack using three real-world datasets, i.e., Bitcoin,
Twitter, and COLLAB. The Bitcoin and Twitter datasets represent fraudulent transaction
detection and fake user detection, respectively. COLLAB is a scientific collaboration dataset.
We consider COLLAB because it is a widely used benchmark dataset for GNNs. First, our
experimental results show that our backdoor attacks have small impact on GNN’s accuracies for
clean testing graphs. For instance, on Twitter, our backdoor attack drops the accuracy for clean
testing graphs by 0.03 even if the trigger size is 30% of the average number of nodes per graph.
Second, our attacks have high success rates. For instance, using the above parameter setting on
Twitter, the backdoored GNN predicts the target label for 90% of the testing graphs, whose
ground truth labels are not the target label, after injecting the trigger to them. Third, the trigger
synthesis methods ER and SW have similar performance and they achieve higher attack success
rates than PA. The reason is that the subgraph generated by PA is more similar to subgraphs
in natural graphs (they have power-law degree distributions), and thus the backdoored GNN is
less likely to associate the subgraph/trigger with the target label.
Certified defense. Generally speaking, there are two types of defenses to build robust
machine learning systems: empirical defenses and certified defenses. Empirical defenses defend
against specific attacks and are often broken by strong adaptive attacks. For instance, in the
image domain, Salem et al. [38] proposed dynamic backdoor attacks and showed that it can
bypass state-of-the-art backdoor defense mechanisms [45, 13, 33]. Therefore, we focus on certified
defenses in this work. Randomized smoothing [32, 4, 25, 28, 10] is state-of-the-art technique
to build provably robust machine learning, which is applicable to arbitrary classifiers and is
scalable to large-scale neural networks. Specifically, given an arbitrary classifier, randomized
smoothing builds a smoothed classifier via randomizing the input. The label predicted by the
smoothed classifier for an input provably remains the same when the `p norm of the adversarial
perturbation added to the input is less than a threshold.
Graph is binary data, i.e., a pair of nodes can be connected or unconnected. Randomized
subsampling [27] is state-of-the-art randomized smoothing method for binary data. Therefore,
we generalize randomized subsampling to defend against our backdoor attacks. When applied
to our problem, to predict the label of a testing graph, randomized subsampling creates d
subsampled graphs via randomizing the testing graph, uses the GNN to predict labels of the
d subsampled graphs, and takes majority vote among the d labels as the predicted label for
the testing graph. To create a subsampled graph, we randomly subsample some node pairs in
the testing graph, keep their connection status (connected or unconnected), and remove the
edges (if any) between the remaining node pairs. With such randomized subsampling, a GNN
provably predicts the same label for a testing graph once the size of the trigger injected to the
testing graph is less than a threshold. We call the threshold certified trigger size. Note that
certified trigger size may be different for different testing graphs.
We empirically evaluate the randomized subsampling based defense on the three datasets.
On one hand, our results show that randomized subsampling can effectively defend against our
backdoor attacks in some cases. For instance, on the Twitter dataset, randomized subsampling
drops the attack success rates by 0.39 with only 0.02 accuracy drop for clean testing graphs,
when the trigger size is 20% of the average number of nodes per graph. On the other hand,
randomized subsampling is ineffective in other cases, e.g., when the trigger size is large. For
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instance, on Twitter, randomized subsampling can only reduce the attack success rates by <0.01
when the trigger size is 30% of the average number of nodes per graph. The reason is that
randomized subsampling only achieves small certified trigger sizes. For instance, on Twitter,
all testing graphs have certified trigger sizes less than 10% of the average number of nodes per
graph. Our results highlight the needs of new defenses against our subgraph based backdoor
attacks.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We perform the first systematic study on backdoor attacks to GNNs.
• We propose subgraph based backdoor attacks to GNNs. We extensively evaluate our
attacks on three real-world datasets.
• We generalize a state-of-the-art certified defense to defend against our backdoor attacks.
Our empirical results highlight the needs of new defenses against our backdoor attacks.
2 Background and Problem Setup
2.1 Graph Neural Networks (GNNs)
Graph classification: Suppose we are given a graph G. We focus on undirected graphs for
simplicity, though our methods can also be extended to directed graphs. A node in the graph
may or may not have features. When a node has features, they may describe certain attributes
of the node. Graph classification takes a graph as input and outputs a label for the graph.
Formally, we have:
f : G −→ {1, 2, · · · , c}, (1)
where f is a graph classifier and {1, 2, · · · , c} is the set of labels. GNN based graph classi-
fication [23, 18, 49, 40] extends neural networks to graph data. Roughly speaking, a GNN
iteratively maps a node to a feature vector via aggregating the feature vectors of the node’s
neighbors, and the last layer of the neural network outputs a label for the graph. Note that the
graph does not need to be connected, i.e., GNN can still predict a label for a graph even if the
graph consists of multiple disconnected components.
Training GNNs for graph classification: Suppose we are given a training datasetDtr={(G1,
y1), (G2, y2), · · · , (GN , yN )}, where Gi and yi respectively are the ith training graph and its
true label, i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is often used to learn a GNN
classifier from a training dataset. In particular, we randomly sample a batch of training graphs
and compute the gradient of the loss function with respect to the model parameters for the
batch. The loss function is usually cross-entropy loss. Then, we move the model parameters
towards the inverse direction of the gradient by a small step. Formally, we have:
θ = θ − lr · ∇θL(θ; batch), (2)
where θ is the model parameters of the GNN classifier f , lr is called learning rate, ∇θ is gradient
with respect to θ, L is loss function, and batch is a batch of training graphs randomly sampled
from the training dataset. This process is repeated until convergence or the maximum number
of iterations is reached. The learnt GNN classifier f is then used to predict labels for testing
graphs.
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Figure 2: Illustration of our subgraph based backdoor attack.
In this work, we show that GNN is vulnerable to backdoor attacks. In particular, an attacker
adds a subgraph trigger to some training graphs and changes their labels to an attacker-chosen
target label. Then, the learnt GNN classifier is very likely to predict the target label for any
testing graph once the same subgraph trigger is added to the testing graph.
2.2 Threat Model
Our threat model is largely inspired by backdoor attacks in the image domain [16, 6, 34, 30, 39, 38].
We characterize the threat model with respect to attacker’s goal and attacker’s capability.
Attacker’s goal: An attacker has two goals. First, the backdoor attack should not influence
the GNN classifier’s accuracy on clean testing graphs, which makes the backdoor attack stealthy.
If an attack sacrifices a GNN classifier’s accuracy substantially, a defender could detect such low
accuracy using a clean validation dataset and the GNN classifier may not be deployed. Second,
the backdoored GNN classifier should predict an attacker-chosen target label for any testing
graph once a trigger is injected to the testing graph.
Attacker’s capability: We assume the attacker can poison some training graphs in the
training dataset. Specifically, the attacker can inject a trigger to each poisoned training graph
and change its label to an attacker-chosen target label. For instance, when the training graphs
are crowdsourced from users, malicious users under an attacker’s control can provide such
poisoned training graphs. Moreover, the attacker can inject the same trigger to testing graphs,
e.g., the attacker’s own testing graphs.
3 Our Subgraph based Backdoor Attacks
3.1 Attack Overview
Figure 2 illustrates the pipeline of our subgraph based backdoor attack. Our backdoor attack
uses a subgraph as a backdoor trigger. Suppose a subgraph consists of t nodes. Injecting the
subgraph to a graph means that we sample t nodes from the graph uniformly at random, map
them to the t nodes in the subgraph randomly, and replace their connections as the subgraph.
In the training phase, an attacker injects a subgraph/trigger to a subset of training graphs
and changes their labels to an attacker-chosen target label. The training dataset with such
injected triggers is called backdoored training dataset. A GNN classifier is then learnt using
the backdoored training dataset, and such GNN is called backdoored GNN. The backdoored
GNN correlates the target label with the trigger because the backdoored training graphs share
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Table 1: Notations
Notation Description
G a graph
f GNN classifier
t trigger size
ρ trigger density
M trigger synthesis method
γ poisoning intensity
fc clean GNN classifier
fb backdoored GNN classifier
d number of subsampled graphs
β fraction of subsampled node pairs in G
the trigger in common and the backdoored GNN is forced to associate the backdoored training
graphs with the target label. In the testing phase, the attacker injects the same subgraph/trigger
to a testing graph and the backdoored GNN is very likely to predict the target label for the
testing graph with trigger injected.
3.2 Attack Design
Our backdoor attack involves injecting a backdoor trigger, i.e., a subgraph, to a graph. Designing
the subgraph is key to our backdoor attack. Intuitively, the subgraph should be unique among
the clean training/testing graphs, so the backdoored GNN is more likely to associate the target
label with the subgraph. A naive method is to construct a complete subgraph (i.e., every pair
of nodes in the subgraph is connected) as a backdoor trigger. However, such trigger could be
easily detected especially when the number of nodes in the subgraph is large. For instance, a
defender may search for complete subgraphs in a training or testing graph, and a complete
subgraph may be detected as a backdoor trigger when complete subgraphs are unlikely to occur
in the clean training/testing graphs. Therefore, we propose to generate a random subgraph
as backdoor trigger. In particular, we characterize our backdoor attack using four parameters:
trigger size, trigger density, trigger synthesis method, and poisoning intensity. Next, we describe
each of them. Table 1 shows some important notations used in our paper.
Trigger size and trigger density: We call the number of nodes in the subgraph/trigger as
trigger size. We denote the trigger size as t. Given t nodes, there are t·(t−1)2 pairs of nodes,
which is the maximum number of edges that a subgraph with t nodes could have. We define the
trigger density of a subgraph as the ratio between the number of edges in the subgraph and the
number of node pairs in the subgraph. We denote ρ as the trigger density. Formally, we have
ρ = 2et·(t−1) , where e is the number of edges in the subgraph.
Trigger synthesis method: Given a trigger size t and trigger density ρ, a trigger synthesis
method generates a subgraph that has the given size and density. The network science community
has developed many generative graph models to synthesize graphs. We consider three popular
such generative graph models, i.e., Erdős-Rényi (ER) model [14], Small World (SW) model [46],
and Preferential Attachment (PA) model [2]. Among the three models, PA generates subgraphs
that are the most similar to subgraphs in natural clean graphs, e.g., they have power-law degree
distributions.
• Erdős-Rényi (ER) model [14]: Given t nodes, ER creates an edge for each pair of nodes
with probability p independently. p is the expected density of the subgraph generated by
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Table 2: Statistics of datasets.
Datasets #Graphs #Classes Avg. #nodes Avg. density
#Training graphs #Testing graphs
Class 0 Class 1 Class 2 Class 0 Class 1 Class 2
Bitcoin 658 2 11.53 0.342 219 219 - 110 110 -
Twitter 1,481 2 63.10 0.523 489 498 - 245 249 -
COLLAB 5,000 3 73.49 0.510 517 1,589 1,215 258 794 608
ER. Therefore, we set p = ρ, which means that the generated subgraph has the given
trigger density ρ on average.
• Small World (SW) model [46]: SW generates a subgraph in which most nodes can be
reached from every other node by a small number of hops even though most nodes are not
neighbors of one another. In a nutshell, SW model first creates a ring in which each node
is connected with its k nearest neighbors. Then, for each edge in the ring, SW randomly
rewires it with a certain probability, i.e., we move one of its end to a new node chosen
uniformly at random from the rest of nodes with a certain probability. The parameter k
is related to the density of the subgraph. We set k = d(t− 1)ρe, with which the generated
subgraph roughly has density ρ.
• Preferential Attachment (PA) model [2]: Real-world graphs often have power-law
node degree distributions [2], i.e., a small number of nodes have large degrees and majority
of nodes have small degrees. Unlike ER and SW, PA generates a subgraph whose node
degree distribution follows power law. Specifically, PA adds nodes to the subgraph in
a step-by-step manner. Initially, the subgraph has k nodes and no edges. In each step,
a new node is added to the subgraph and the new node is connected with randomly
picked k existing nodes in the subgraph, where the probability that a node is picked is
proportional to its degree. Intuitively, a new node prefers to connect with nodes who are
already connected with many other nodes. The parameter k is related to the density of the
generated subgraph. Formally, we set k = d t−
√
t2−2·t·(t−1)·ρ
2 e, which allows the generated
subgraph to roughly have density ρ. Note that PA requires ρ to be smaller than some
threshold (i.e., the subgraph cannot be too dense) such that k is a positive integer.
Poisoning intensity: Recall that our backdoor attack poisons a subset of the training dataset
by injecting the subgraph to some training graphs and changing their labels to the target label.
Poisoning intensity is the fraction of training graphs that are poisoned by the attacker. We
denote by γ the poisoning intensity.
4 Attack Evaluation
4.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets: We evaluate our attacks on three publicly available real-world graph datasets.
Table 2 shows the statistics of our datasets.
• Bitcoin [47]: This graph dataset is used for graph-based fraudulent Bitcoin transaction
detection. The original dataset has Bitcoin transactions collected at more than 40 different
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timestamps. Some transactions are manually labeled as illicit, some transactions are
manually labeled as licit, while the remaining ones are unlabeled. We extracted 658 labeled
transactions. We represent each transaction as a graph. Specifically, in a graph, nodes are
a transaction and the transactions that have Bitcoin flow with it and an edge between
two transactions means that there was Bitcoin currency flow between them. Therefore,
there are 658 graphs and each graph has a label 0 or 1, which corresponds to illicit and
licit transaction, respectively.
• Twitter [44]: This dataset is used for graph-based fake user detection. In the original
dataset, some users are labeled as fake, some are labeled as genuine, and the remaining
are unlabeled. We randomly picked 1, 481 labeled users. We represent each user using its
ego network. In particular, in a user’s ego network, the user and its followers/followees are
nodes and an edge between two users indicates that they follow each other. A user’s ego
network is labeled as 0 if the user is fake and 1 otherwise. Therefore, this dataset includes
1,481 graphs and each graph has a label 0 or 1.
• COLLAB [51]: COLLAB is a scientific collaboration dataset. A graph corresponds to a
researcher’s ego network, i.e., the researcher and its collaborators are nodes and an edge
indicates collaboration between two researchers. A researcher’s ego network has three
possible labels, i.e., High Energy Physics, Condensed Matter Physics, and Astro Physics,
which are the fields that the researcher belongs to. The dataset has 5,000 graphs and each
graph has label 0, 1, or 2.
The Bitcoin and Twitter datasets represent GNN-based fraud detection. Both of them
are binary classification tasks. We consider the COLLAB dataset because it is a widely used
benchmark for GNNs and it represents a multi-class classification task. For all three datasets,
we extract a node’s degree as its node feature. These diverse datasets can demonstrate the
effectiveness of our backdoor attacks in different domains.
Dataset splits and construction: We split each dataset to training dataset and testing
dataset. Moreover, we construct backdoored training dataset and backdoored testing dataset
via injecting a trigger to the graphs. In particular, we have the following datasets:
• Clean training dataset: For each dataset, we sample 2/3 of the graphs uniformly at
random as the training dataset. We call it clean training dataset since there is no backdoor
trigger injected to the graphs.
• Clean testing dataset: For each dataset, we treat the remaining graphs as clean testing
dataset.
• Backdoored training dataset: Since our attack poisons some training graphs, we
construct a backdoored training dataset from each clean training dataset. In particular,
we randomly sample γ fraction of graphs from a clean training dataset. Then, for each
sampled training graph, we inject our backdoor trigger to it and relabel it as the target
label. We assume label 1 as target label. In Bitcoin and Twitter, selecting label 1 as
target label means evading fraud detection.
• Backdoored testing dataset: To evaluate the effectiveness of our attack, we create a
backdoored testing dataset for each dataset. For each testing graph whose true label is
not the target label, we inject our trigger to it. These testing graphs with injected trigger
constitute our backdoored testing dataset.
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GNN classifiers: We adopt the popular GIN method [49] as our GNN classifier. We use a
publicly available implementation* of GIN in our experiments. When a classifier is learnt using
a clean training dataset, we call the classifier clean classifier and we denote it as fc. When a
classifier is learnt using a backdoored training dataset, we call the classifier backdoored classifier
and we denote it as fb.
Evaluation metrics: We use Clean Accuracy, Backdoor Accuracy, and Attack Success Rate as
evaluation metrics. Clean accuracy and backdoor accuracy respectively measure the accuracies
of a clean classifier and a backdoored classifier for a clean testing dataset, while attack success
rate is the fraction of graphs in the backdoored testing dataset that are predicted to have the
target label by a backdoored classifier. Next, we describe them in detail.
• Clean Accuracy: Given a clean classifier fc and a clean testing dataset Dct = {(G1, y1),
(G2, y2), · · · , (Gn, yn)}, we define the clean accuracy as the fraction of graphs in the clean
testing dataset that are correctly predicted by the clean classifier fc. Formally, we have
the following:
Clean Accuracy =
∑n
i=1 I(fc(Gi) = yi)
n
, (3)
where I is an indicator function.
• Backdoor Accuracy: The backdoor accuracy measures the accuracy of a backdoored
classifier on the clean testing dataset. In particular, we define backdoor accuracy as the
fraction of graphs in the clean testing dataset that can be correctly predicted by the
backdoored classifier. Formally, we have the following:
Backdoor Accuracy =
∑n
i=1 I(fb(Gi) = yi)
n
, (4)
where I is an indicator function. The difference between backdoor accuracy and clean
accuracy measures the impact of our backdoor attack on accuracy for clean testing graphs.
Recall that one of our attacker’s goals is that the accuracy on clean testing graphs should
not be influenced by our attack, i.e., backdoor accuracy and clean accuracy should be
close.
• Attack Success Rate: We use attack success rate to measure the effectiveness of our
attack. Specifically, given a backdoored testing dataset Dbt = {(G1, y1),
(G2, y2), · · · , (Gm, ym)}, we define attack success rate as the fraction of graphs in Dbt for
which the backdoored classifier predicts the target label. Formally, we have the following:
Attack Success Rate =
∑m
i=1 I(fb(Gi) = l)
n
, (5)
where l is the attacker-chosen target label.
Parameter setting: Our attack has the following parameters: trigger size t, trigger density
ρ, trigger synthesis method M , and poisoning intensity γ. Different datasets have different
graph sizes. Therefore, for each dataset, we set the trigger size t to be ϕ fraction of the average
*https://github.com/weihua916/powerful-gnns
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Figure 3: Impact of trigger size.
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Figure 4: Impact of trigger density.
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Figure 5: Impact of poisoning intensity.
number of nodes per graph in the dataset (we use ceiling to obtain an integer number as the
trigger size). Unless otherwise mentioned, we adopt the following default parameter settings:
ϕ = 20%, ρ = 0.8, M = ER, and γ = 5% in all three datasets. We will explore the impact
of each parameter while fixing the remaining ones to their default settings. Note that when a
graph has less nodes than the trigger size, we replace the graph as the trigger. ER may generate
a subgraph/trigger with no edges as it randomly creates edges. When such case happens, we
run ER multiple times until generating a subgraph with at least one edge. SW rewires an edge
with a probability, which we set to be 0.8.
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Figure 6: Comparing trigger synthesis methods.
Table 3: Attack success rates when injecting the trigger to only training graphs,
only testing graphs, and both.
Bitcoin Twitter COLLAB
Attack Success Rate-Baseline 0.40 0.19 0.25
Attack Success Rate-Train 0.45 0.28 0.37
Attack Success Rate-Test 0.51 0.24 0.52
Attack Success Rate 0.78 0.82 0.75
4.2 Results
Impact of trigger size, trigger density, and poisoning intensity: Figure 3, Figure 4,
and Figure 5 respectively show the impact of trigger size, trigger density, and poisoning intensity,
where the trigger synthesis method is ER. We start the trigger size from 20% of the average
number of nodes for Bitcoin because a graph in Bitcoin has around 11 nodes on average. First,
we observe that our backdoor attacks have small impact on the accuracies for clean testing
graphs. Specifically, backdoor accuracy is slightly smaller than clean accuracy. For instance,
when the trigger size is 20% of the average number of nodes per graph, the backdoor accuracy is
0.03, 0.03, and 0.04 smaller than the clean accuracy on the three datasets, respectively. Second,
our backdoor attacks achieve high attack success rates and the attack success rates increase as
the trigger size, trigger density, or poisoning intensity increases. The reason is that when the
trigger size, trigger density, or poisoning intensity is larger, the backdoored GNN is more likely
to associate the target label with the trigger.
Comparing trigger synthesis methods: Figure 6 compares the three trigger synthesis
methods, where we set ρ = 0.4 since PA requires it to be small (see Section 3.2). Our results
show that ER and SW achieve similar performance. Moreover, ER and SW have higher attack
success rates than PA. We suspect the reason is that the subgraph generated by PA is more
similar to subgraphs in the clean graphs, e.g., they have power-law degree distributions, and
thus the backdoored GNN is less likely to associate the target label with the subgraph.
Injecting trigger in training vs. testing graphs: Backdoor attacks inject a trigger to
some training graphs and also testing graphs. One natural question is how successful a backdoor
attack is if we only inject the trigger to the training graphs or testing graphs alone. Table 3
shows the attack success rates of our backdoor attacks when injecting the trigger to only training
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Figure 7: Attack success rate as a function of the average graph density on Twitter.
Our trigger density is 0.3.
graphs, only testing graphs, and both. We denote by Dc the set of clean testing graphs whose
true labels are not the target label. Attack Success Rate-Baseline is the fraction of clean
testing graphs in Dc that are predicted to have the target label by the clean GNN. Attack
Success Rate-Baseline measures an attacker’s success rate without injecting a trigger to any
training/testing graph. Attack Success Rate-Train is the fraction of clean testing graphs in Dc
that are predicted to have the target label by the backdoored GNN. Attack Success Rate-Test
is the fraction of testing graphs in Dc that are predicted to have the target label by the clean
GNN when injecting the trigger to them. Attack Success Rate corresponds to our attack that
injects the trigger to both training and testing graphs.
We observe that injecting trigger to both training and testing graphs does improve attack
success rates substantially. We also observe that injecting trigger to either training graphs
or testing graphs alone increases the attack success rate upon the baseline. This is because
injecting trigger to training or testing graphs makes the GNN classifiers less accurate. For
Bitcoin and Twitter, being less accurate is equivalent to higher attack success rate since the
two datasets are binary classification. For COLLAB, the GNN classifiers are biased to be more
likely to predict label 1 (i.e., target label) when making an incorrect prediction because label 1
has more training graphs (see Table 2), and thus being less accurate increases the attack success
rate.
Impact of graph density: Intuitively, for a given trigger, the effectiveness of our backdoor
attack may depend on the density of the clean training/testing graphs. To study the impact of
the density of clean graphs, we randomly delete some edges in the Twitter graphs such that
the average graph density ranges from 0.1 to 0.5. Figure 7 shows the attack success rate of
our attack as a function of the average graph density, where we set the trigger density to be
0.3 and the trigger size to be 20% of the average number of nodes per graph. We observe a
decreasing trend of attack success rate as the average graph density increases. One exception is
that our attack success rate has a “local minimum” at the point where the average graph density
is the trigger density. In other words, among the average graph densities that are around the
trigger density, our attack is the least effective when the average graph density is the same as
the trigger density. The reason is that it is harder for GNN to distinguish between the trigger
and other subgraphs in the clean graphs when they have the same density, and thus it is harder
for the backdoored GNN to associate the trigger with the target label.
Fixed vs. random triggers: In all our experiments above, we use the same trigger in the
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Table 4: Fixed trigger vs. random trigger on Twitter.
Backdoor Accuracy Attack Success Rate
Fixed trigger 0.67 0.82
Random trigger 0.66 0.81
training graphs and testing graphs. Table 4 compares the backdoor accuracy and attack success
rate when we use ER to generate one trigger and fix it (corresponding to “Fixed trigger”) and
when we use ER to generate a random trigger with the given trigger size and density for each
poisoned training graph and testing graph (corresponding to “Random trigger”). Our results
show that random trigger is nearly as effective as fixed trigger. We suspect the reason is that
the random triggers are structurally similar, e.g., they may be isomorphic, and a backdoored
GNN can associate the structurally similar triggers with the target label.
5 Certified Defense
5.1 Overview
Generally speaking, there are two types of defenses to build robust machine learning systems,
i.e., empirical defenses and certified defenses. Empirical defenses are usually designed to defend
against specific attacks and are often broken by strong adaptive attacks, which leads to a
cat-and-mouse game between attackers and defenders. For instance, for backdoor attacks in the
image domain, Salem et al. [38] proposed dynamic backdoor attacks and showed it can bypass
state-of-the-art empirical defenses [45, 13, 33]. Therefore, we focus on certified defenses in this
work. A certified defense provably predicts the same label for all data points in a certain region
around an input.
Randomized smoothing [4, 32, 25, 28, 10] is state-of-the-art technique to build provably
robust machine learning. In particular, given an arbitrary classifier (called base classifier),
randomized smoothing builds a smoothed classifier via randomizing an input, e.g., adding
Gaussian noise to the input or randomly subsampling some features of the input. Roughly
speaking, given an input, the smoothed classifier predicts the label that is the most likely to be
returned by the base classifier when randomizing the input. Such predicted label for an input
by the smoothed classifier certifiably remains the same when the `p norm of the perturbation
added to the input is less than a certain threshold.
Graph is essentially binary data, i.e., a pair of nodes can be either connected or unconnected.
For binary data, a randomized smoothing method called randomized subsampling [27] achieves
state-of-the-art certified robustness. Therefore, we design our certified defense based on ran-
domized subsampling. Next, we first introduce randomized subsampling and then discuss how
to extend it to defend against our backdoor attacks.
5.2 Randomized Subsampling
Building a smoothed classifier via subsampling: Suppose we have a s-dimensional input
x and a base classifier h which maps x to a set of c labels {1, 2, · · · , c}. Randomized subsampling
creates a subsampled input via keeping z randomly subsampled features in x and setting the
remaining features in x to a special value (e.g., 0). We denote such subsampled input as
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S(x, z). Since the subsampled input S(x, z) is random, the output of the base classifier h for
the subsampled input is also random. We denote pj as the probability that the base classifier h
outputs label j when taking S(x, z) as input, i.e., pj = Pr(h(S(x, z)) = j), ∀j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , c}.
Then, randomized subsampling builds a smoothed classifier h¯, which returns the label with the
largest probability pj for the input x. Formally, we have:
h¯(x) = arg max
j∈{1,2,··· ,c}
Pr(h(S(x, z)) = j) = arg max
j∈{1,2,··· ,c}
pj , (6)
where h¯(x) is the label that the smoothed classifier predicts for x. In practice, to calculate the
predicted label h¯(x), we create d subsampled inputs from x, use the base classifier to predict
their labels, and take a majority vote among the d labels as the predicted label h¯(x) (the
majority vote label has the largest probability pj).
Certified robustness: Suppose an attacker adds a perturbation δ to an input x. The
smoothed classifier certifiably predicts the same label for x when the `0 norm of the perturbation
is no larger than a threshold R, i.e., h¯(x+ δ) = h¯(x), ∀||δ||0 ≤ R. Moreover, R is the maximum
integer that satisfies the following inequality:(
s−R
z
)
> (1.5− pl)
(
s
z
)
, (7)
where
(
s−R
z
)
is the combination of s−R things taken z at a time, l is the predicted label for x
by the smoothed classifier (i.e., l = arg maxj∈{1,2,··· ,c} pj), and pl is a lower bound of pl.
Estimating l and pl: To calculate R in Equation (7), we need to know l and pl, which can be
estimated using a Monte-Carlo sampling method with a probabilistic guarantee [10]. Specifically,
we randomly create d subsampled inputs from x. We use the base classifier to predict the labels
of the d subsampled inputs. The smoothed classifier takes a majority vote among the d labels,
i.e., the most frequent label among the d subsampled inputs is predicted as the label l for x.
Moreover, we denote by dl the number of subsampled inputs for which the base classifier predicts
label l. Theoretically, dl follows a binomial distribution with parameters d and pl. Therefore,
according to the Clopper-Pearson method [9], a lower bound pl of pl can be estimated with a
confidence level 1− α as follows:
pl = B(α; dl, d− dl + 1), (8)
where B(α; ν, µ) is the αth quantile of the Beta distribution with shape parameters ν and µ.
5.3 Defending against our Backdoor Attacks
We leverage randomized subsampling to defend against our backdoor attacks. Next, we discuss
how to predict label for a testing graph using a smoothed GNN classifier, the certified robustness
guarantee of the smoothed GNN classifier, and our method of training a base GNN classifier to
improve the accuracy and robustness of the smoothed GNN classifier.
Smoothed GNN: Suppose we are given an GNN classifier (called base GNN classifier) and a
testing graph G. The base GNN classifier can be a backdoored GNN classifier. We can represent
the structure of a graph as a binary vector (called structure vector), where each entry of the
vector corresponds to the connection status (connected or unconnected) of a pair of nodes
in the graph. We view the structure vector as an input x in randomized subsampling. The
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Figure 8: Illustration of the robustness of smoothed GNN against our backdoor
attacks.
smoothed GNN classifier predicts label for the testing graph G following three steps. First,
we create d subsampled graphs from the testing graph G. Specifically, to create a subsampled
graph, we randomly sample z entries in the testing graph’s structure vector, keep their values,
set the remaining entries of the structure vector to be 0, and convert the perturbed structure
vector to a graph. Note that when a node feature (e.g., node degree) is derived from the graph
structure, the feature should also be recalculated for nodes in the subsampled graph. We set
z as β fraction of the entries in the testing graph’s structure vector in our experiments, i.e.,
z = dβ|G|(|G| − 1)/2e. We call β subsampling ratio. Second, we use the base GNN classifier to
predict labels of the d subsampled graphs. Note that the base GNN can still predict a label
even if a subsampled graph is disconnected. Third, the smoothed GNN classifier takes majority
vote among the d labels as the predicted label for the testing graph G. We denote the predicted
label as l and by dl the number of subsampled graphs that are predicted to have label l by the
base GNN classifier.
Certified robustness: Figure 8 shows an example to illustrate the robustness of the smoothed
GNN classifier against our backdoor attacks, where the base GNN classifier is a backdoored
GNN in the example. When the trigger is small, a majority of the d subsampled graphs do not
include edges in the trigger. Therefore, a majority of the predicted labels for the subsampled
graphs are not influenced by the trigger and the majority vote among the predicted labels of the
subsampled graphs (i.e., the label predicted by the smoothed GNN classifier) is not influenced
by the trigger.
Formally, the smoothed GNN classifier provably predicts the same label for a testing graph
G once the `0 norm of the perturbation added to the graph’s structure vector is bounded by
R in Equation (7), where s = |G|(|G| − 1)/2 is the number of entries in the graph’s structure
vector. Our attack injects a trigger to a graph, which can be viewed as flipping some entries of
the graph’s binary structure vector. Therefore, the `0 norm of the perturbation introduced by
our attack is the number of entries of a graph’s structure vector that are flipped by our trigger,
i.e., the number of edges that are deleted or added by our trigger. Injecting a trigger with size t
to a graph deletes or adds at most t(t− 1)/2 edges in the graph. Therefore, we know that the
smoothed GNN classifier predicts the same label for a testing graph once the size of the trigger
added to the testing graph is no larger than a threshold T . Formally, based on Equation (7)
with s = |G|(|G| − 1)/2 and R = T (T − 1)/2, we have T is the largest integer that satisfies the
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Algorithm 1 Training with Subsampling
Input: Dtr, max_iter, β, and lr (learning rate).
Output: Model parameter θ
1: Initialize θ
2: iter = 0
3: while iter < max_iter do
4: batch = MiniBatch(Dtr)
5: //we adapt the following two steps
6: subsampled_batch = Subsample_batch(batch, β)
7: θ = θ − lr · ∇θL(θ; subsampled_batch)
8: iter = iter + 1
9: end while
10: return θ
following: (|G|(|G| − 1)/2− T (T − 1)/2
z
)
> (1.5− pl)
(|G|(|G| − 1)/2
z
)
, (9)
where pl is estimated using Equation (8). We call the threshold T certified trigger size. When
estimating pl, we set the confidence level 1− α to be 0.999 in experiments.
Training base GNN classifier with subsampling: We can build a smoothed GNN classifier
from any base GNN classifier, e.g., a backdoored GNN classifier. In our smoothed GNN classifier,
the base GNN classifier is used to predict labels for subsampled graphs instead of the original
testing graph. Therefore, the testing data distribution for the base GNN classifier is different
from its training data distribution, which limits the accuracy of the base GNN classifier on
the subsampled graphs and thus limits the accuracy and robustness of the smoothed GNN
classifier. To overcome the distribution shift issue, we propose to train the base GNN classifier
with subsampling. Algorithm 1 shows our training with subsampling. When using a random
batch of training graphs to calculate the gradient of the loss function, we create a subsampled
graph for each training graph in the batch and use the subsampled graphs to calculate the
gradient and update the model parameters. Our experimental results demonstrate that training
the base GNN classifier with subsampling significantly improves the accuracy and robustness of
the smoothed GNN classifier.
6 Defense Evaluation
6.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets: We also evaluate our defense on the three datasets, i.e., Bitcoin, Twitter, and
COLLAB. Moreover, the dataset splits are the same as those in our attack evaluation in
Section 4.1.
Smoothed GIN classifiers: Like our attack evaluation, we consider GIN as our GNN
classifier. When building our smoothed GIN classifier, we train the base GIN classifier with
subsampling. Specifically, we train a clean base GIN classifier and a backdoored base GIN
classifier using a clean training dataset and a backdoored training dataset, respectively. Then,
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Table 5: Training with subsampling vs. training without subsampling on Twitter.
Clean Accuracy Backdoor Accuracy Attack Success Rate
Training without subsampling 0.48 0.43 0.97
Training with subsampling 0.71 0.69 0.35
we build a smoothed clean GIN classifier and a smoothed backdoored GIN classifier from them,
respectively. We also train a clean GIN classifier and a backdoored GIN classifier using a clean
training dataset and a backdoored training dataset, respectively. The clean/backdoored GIN
classifiers are used as baselines to evaluate the performance of the smoothed clean/backdoored
GIN classifiers. They are trained in the same way as those in our attack evaluation. In particular,
they are not trained with subsampling since they are not used to build smoothed classifiers.
Evaluation metrics: We also consider Clean Accuracy, Backdoor Accuracy, and Attack
Success Rate as our evaluation metrics. The clean accuracy of a smoothed clean GIN classifier is
the fraction of testing graphs in the clean testing dataset whose labels are correctly predicted by
the classifier. The backdoor accuracy of a smoothed backdoored GIN classifier is the fraction of
testing graphs in the clean testing dataset whose labels are correctly predicted by the classifier.
The attack success rate of a smoothed backdoored GIN classifier is the fraction of testing graphs
in the backdoored testing dataset whose labels are predicted as the target label by the classifier.
Parameter setting: The attack parameter settings are the same as those in Section 4.1. Our
defense has two parameters: number of subsampled graphs d and subsampling ratio β. Unless
otherwise mentioned, we adopt the following default setting: d = 100 and β = 10% on all three
datasets. We will explore the impact of one parameter while fixing the other parameter to its
default setting.
6.2 Results
Training with subsampling vs. training without subsampling: Table 5 shows the
clean accuracy of our smoothed clean GIN classifier, and the backdoor accuracy and attack
success rate of our smoothed backdoored GIN classifier, when the base GIN classifiers are
trained with or without subsampling. We observe that training with subsampling substantially
improves our smoothed classifiers. Moreover, the clean accuracy and backdoor accuracy are close,
especially after training with subsampling. Therefore, we will only show backdoor accuracy in
the remaining experiments for simplicity.
Impact of the number of subsampled graphs d and subsampling ratio β: Figure 9
and Figure 10 respectively show the impact of d and β on the backdoor accuracies and the attack
success rates of the backdoored GIN classifier and our smoothed backdoored GIN classifier. The
curves corresponding to the backdoored GIN classifier are straight lines in the figures as they do
not rely on d nor β. Our results show that our smoothed classifiers achieve a tradeoff between
backdoor accuracy and attack success rate. In particular, our smoothed backdoored GIN has
lower backdoor accuracies than the backdoored GIN, but our smoothed backdoored GIN also
has lower attack success rates. d has a negligible impact on the smoothed backdoored GIN
classifier when it is larger than 10. Our results indicate that our smoothed classifiers predict
labels stably with only dozens of subsampled graphs. The reason may be that our datasets are
binary or three-class classification problems. As β increases, our smoothed backdoored GIN
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Figure 9: Impact of the number of subsampled graphs d.
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Figure 10: Impact of subsampling ratio β.
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Figure 11: Impact of trigger size.
classifier has higher backdoor accuracy but also higher attack success rate. The reason is that a
higher subsampling ratio keeps more information of a testing graph in a subsampled graph but
the subsampled graph is also more likely to include edges from the backdoor trigger.
Impact of trigger size: Figure 11 shows the impact of trigger size on the backdoor accuracy
and attack success rate. When the trigger size is small, the smoothed backdoored GIN can
reduce the attack success rate with some backdoor accuracy drop, compared to the backdoored
GIN. In some scenarios, the attack success rate drops substantially with a small backdoor
accuracy drop, indicating that randomized subsampling is an effective defense against our
backdoor attacks. For instance, on Twitter, the smoothed backdoored GIN drops the attack
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Figure 12: Cumulative distribution function of the certified trigger size.
success rate by 0.39 with only 0.02 backdoor accuracy drop, when the trigger size is 20% of
the average number of nodes per graph. However, as the trigger size increases, the drops of
the attack success rate become negligible in some scenarios. One notable example is that the
smoothed backdoored GIN and backdoored GIN have almost the same attack success rate on
Twitter when the trigger size is 30% of the average number of nodes per graph. The reason is
that the smoothed backdoored GIN has small certified trigger sizes. For instance, Figure 12
shows the cumulative distribution function of the certified trigger sizes of the testing graphs
under the default parameter setting. All testing graphs have trigger sizes less than 10% of the
average number of nodes per graph on Twitter. Our results highlight the needs of new defenses
against our backdoor attacks, especially when the triggers are large.
7 Discussion and Limitations
Applying our certified defense to image backdoor attacks: Our randomized subsampling
based certified defense can be applied to image backdoor attacks. In particular, given a testing
image and a base classifier (e.g., a backdoored neural network classifier), we can create multiple
subsampled images from the testing image, use the base classifier to predict their labels, and
take majority vote among the labels as the predicted label for the testing image. To create
a subsampled image from the testing image, we randomly subsample some pixels, keep their
values, and set the remaining pixels to a special value (e.g., 0). Such defense can certifiably
predict the same label for a testing image when the size of the trigger injected to it is smaller
than some threshold. We suspect that the defense may be effective in some scenarios, e.g., when
the trigger is small. However, based on our empirical results in Section 6.2, we suspect the
defense may have limited effectiveness when the trigger is large.
Detecting triggers via dense-subgraph detection: One potential way to defend against
our backdoor attacks is to detect our trigger via dense-subgraph detection. This is an empirical
defense and may be effective when our trigger is very dense, e.g., when our trigger is a complete
subgraph. However, an attacker can use a sparser trigger to evade detection. In particular, it
may be hard to detect our trigger via dense-subgraph detection if our trigger is sparser than the
clean graphs. However, our empirical results in Figure 4 and Figure 7 show that our attacks are
still effective even if our triggers are sparser than the clean graphs on average.
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8 Related Work
Backdoor attacks and their defenses in image domain: Deep neural networks in the
image domain were shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks [16, 6, 34, 30, 8, 39, 52, 38].
Specifically, a backdoored neural network classifier produces attacker-desired behaviors when a
trigger is injected into a testing example. For instance, Gu et al. [16] proposed BadNets, which
injects a backdoor trigger (e.g., a patch) to some training images and changes their labels to
the target label. A neural network classifier trained on the backdoored training dataset predicts
the target label for a testing image when the trigger is injected to it. Liu et al. [34] proposed
to inject a backdoor to a neural network via fine tuning, which does not need to poison the
training dataset. Yao et al. [52] developed latent backdoor attacks for transfer learning.
To mitigate backdoor attacks, many defenses [6, 34, 35, 31, 45, 13, 33, 17] have been proposed
in the literature. Liu et al. [31] proposed Fine-Pruning to remove backdoor from a neural network
via pruning its redundant neurons. Wang et al. [45] proposed Neural Cleanse to detect and
reverse engineer the trigger. Gao et al. [13] tried to detect whether an input image includes a
trigger or not via leveraging the input-agnostic characteristic of the backdoor trigger. Liu et
al. [33] proposed ABS to detect whether a neural network is backdoored or not via analyzing
the behaviors of its internal neurons. We note that two work [48, 41], which are concurrent to
ours, studied randomized smoothing based certified defenses against backdoor attacks in image
domain. However, they use randomized smoothing with additive noise, e.g., Gaussian noise,
uniform noise, or discrete noise, which has limited effectiveness at defending against backdoor
attacks. For instance, Wang et al. [41] showed that the certified accuracy drops to 0 when the
attacker perturbs 3 pixels on MNIST 1/7 dataset. We explored randomized subsampling based
certified defense against our backdoor attacks to GNN. Our results show that such certified
defense can reduce attack success rates with small accuracy drops when the trigger size is small,
but it is less effective or ineffective when the trigger size is large.
Attacks to GNNs: Several studies [53, 11, 3, 42, 54] showed that GNNs for node classification
are vulnerable to adversarial structural perturbations. Specifically, an attacker can perturb
the graph structure such that a GNN based node classifier misclassifies many nodes in the
graph indiscriminately or misclassifies some attacker-chosen nodes. For instance, Zügner et
al. [53] proposed an attack that can manipulate the graph structure while preserving important
characteristics of the graph. Wang et al. [42] attacked collective classification via formulating the
attack as an optimization problem and proposing several approximation techniques to solve the
optimization problem. Moreover, their attacks can also transfer to GNN based node classifiers.
Dai et al. [11] proposed a reinforcement learning method to attack GNNs for both node and
graph classification. For graph classification, their method perturbs a testing graph to be an
adversarial example such that a GNN misclassifies it. Chen et al. [7] proposed an attack for
graph-based clustering. Our work is different from these studies because we focus on backdoor
attacks to GNN based graph classification.
Randomized smoothing: Randomized smoothing [32, 4, 25, 28, 10, 27, 26, 21, 12] is state-
of-the-art technique to build provably robust machine learning. Compared with other certified
defense mechanisms, randomized smoothing has two key advantages: 1) scalable to large neural
networks, and 2) applicable to arbitrary classifiers. Randomized smoothing was initially proposed
as an empirical defense [4, 32]. For instance, Cao & Gong [4] proposed to use uniform noise in a
hypercube centered at a testing example to smooth the prediction for the testing example (they
called their method Region-based Classification). Lecuyer et al. [25] derived the first certified
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robustness guarantee for randomized smoothing with Gaussian or Laplacian noise via differential
privacy. Cohen et al. [10] derived the first tight certified robustness guarantee for randomized
smoothing with Gaussian noise by Neyman-Pearson Lemma [36]. Jia et al. [21] generalized
the tight certified robustness guarantee to general top-k predictions for randomized smoothing
with Gaussian noise. Jia et al. [22] leveraged randomized smoothing to certify robustness of
community detection against structural perturbations. All these randomized smoothing methods
add additive noise to a testing example. Levine et al. [27] proposed randomized subsampling,
which does not use additive noise and achieves state-of-the-art `0 norm certified robustness. We
extend randomized subsampling to defend against our backdoor attacks. Our results show that
randomized subsampling is ineffective in some scenarios.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we showed that graph neural networks are vulnerable to backdoor attacks.
Specifically, an attacker can inject a subgraph to some training graphs and change their labels
to an attacker-chosen target label. A GNN classifier that is trained on the backdoored training
dataset is very likely to predict the target label for any testing graph when the same subgraph
is injected to it. Our empirical evaluation results on three real-world datasets show that our
backdoor attacks achieve high success rates with a small impact on the GNN’s accuracies for
clean testing graphs. We also explored a randomized smoothing based certified defense against
our backdoor attacks. Our empirical results show that the certified defense is ineffective in some
scenarios, highlighting the needs of new defenses against our backdoor attacks. Interesting future
work includes: 1) detecting whether a GNN classifier is backdoored or not, and 2) designing
new defenses against our backdoor attacks.
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